What prompted Iran to target Balochistan, and how did Pakistan respond to the missile strikes?
In a series of events, Iran launched missile strikes in Pakistan’s Balochistan province.
Iran targeting alleged strongholds of the Jaish al-Adl.
In response, Pakistan condemned the attacks.
Recalling its Ambassador and expelling the Iranian Ambassador.
While also suspending high profile bilateral visits.
A day later, Pakistan retaliated by targeting individuals and terrorist groups in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province.
However, with a diplomatic approach, Pakistan emphasised its respect for Iran, preventing further escalation.
On January 19, at a National Security Council meeting aimed at addressing security concerns for regional peace.
Both nations decided to de-escalate, reinstating ambassadors, and by January 28, Iran’s Foreign Minister arrived in Islamabad to discuss economic and security matters, signaling a shift towards dialogue and cooperation.
First, the demography and geography of the provinces.
The Sistan-Baluchestan province, one of the largest provinces in Iran, shares the border with Pakistan’s Balochistan and Afghanistan’s southern provinces.
The Baloch are the majority in the Sistan-Baluchestan province, with Sistanis as a minority.
The former is Sunni, while the latter is Shia.
Geographically, Balochistan is the largest of four provinces in Pakistan, with a Baloch majority (which is now being threatened by the Pashtun ingress from Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).
However, Baloch are a minority within Pakistan.
Second, the borders.
Pakistan’s Balochistan province shares a long border with Iran, around 900 km.
Unlike the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which is disputed by Kabul, the Pakistan-Iran border is settled.
Both countries have been building a concrete wall along the border to prevent illegal crossings between Balochistan (in Pakistan) and Sistan-Baluchestan (in Iran) provinces.
However, the border remains ineffective in preventing the illicit movement of people and goods, especially along the land and maritime borders.
Smuggling is common, especially in the south, closer to the Pakistan-Iran maritime border.
Third, two ports of strategic importance — Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran, are situated on the mouths of the Arabian Sea less than 200 km apart.
China and India have invested in these two ports and see them as exit and entry points from/into maritime/mainland Asia.
Baloch provinces are strategically important for Iran and Pakistan.
What key factors contributed to the decision for both nations to de-escalate tensions?
If the escalation was fast, de-escalation was faster.
Immediately after Iran’s initial attack, Pakistan recalled its Ambassador and asked the Iranian Ambassador to leave.
Two days later, Pakistan targeted a few militant targets in the Sistan-Baluchestan province in Iran.
After the swift diplomatic and military escalation, there was a de-escalation.
China is believed to have pressured Islamabad and Tehran.
But more than any external pressure, the bilateral dynamics might have led to the de-escalation.
Given the regional security situation and the immediate neighbourhood, both countries cannot afford an escalation now.
It appears that Iran’s missile strikes in Pakistan had a limited objective as a part of its targets in Syria and Iraq in response to an earlier attack in January 2024 in Kerman.
Similarly, Pakistan’s response seems limited in making a domestic and a bilateral statement.
Both have been careful with their statements to ensure it does not escalate.
Besides there have been efforts in recent years aimed at a rapprochement, which they did not want to jeopardise.
How did the arrival of Iran’s Foreign Minister in Islamabad impact economic and security discussions between the two countries?
In Pakistan, Iran targeted a relatively little-known Sunni militant group — “Jaish al-Adl,” based in Balochistan.
According to Iran’s Foreign Minister, “none of the nationals of the friendly and brotherly country of Pakistan were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.
The Jundullah, believed to be founded by Abdolmalek Rigi, was present then in the Sistan-Baluchestan province and has repeatedly been targeting Iran’s security forces and civilian targets through terrorist activities, including suicide bombings.
Iran has been targeting the Jundullah leader; Rigi, a Baloch, was captured and executed in 2010.
Jundullah was a Sunni group with links to al Qaeda and fighting for “Sunni” rights, rather than an ethnic Baloch militant group.
However, Tehran considers that the Jundullah had the support of the Baloch people across the Sistan-Baluchestan and Balochistan provinces in Iran and Pakistan, respectively.
After Rigi’s death, a few Jundullah members formed the Jaish al-Adl and continued attacking Iran during the 2010s.
Between 2013-2023, the Jaish al-Adl is accused of having carried out numerous attacks, mainly targeting Iran’s security officials; the latest one was in December 2023, where they targeted a police station in Rask in Sistan-Baluchestan, killing 11 security personnel.
In Iran, Pakistan targeted the hideouts belonging to the “Balochistan Liberation Army” and “Balochistan Liberation Front.”
Pakistan has been fighting multiple waves of Baloch insurgency since 1947.
The latest wave of insurgency intensified after the killing of Akbar Bugti, one of the tallest Baloch leaders.
Unlike the Jundullah, the Baloch militant organisations do not have a sectarian agenda or have links with international organisations such as al Qaeda.
They have an ethnic agenda and fight for greater rights for the Baloch; some of them have a separatist agenda and want to establish an independent Balochistan.
What challenges lie ahead for Pakistan and Iran?
Though Tehran was one of the first to recognise Pakistan, since the 1979 Iranian revolution
The two countries had a troubled relationship.
Iran’s revolution in 1979 and Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in Pakistan during the 1980s brought the Sunni-Shia sectarian divide to the fore between the two.
Though both refer to the “brotherly Muslim countries” rhetoric, the sectarian factor was too strong to patch the divide.
Globally, Iran saw Pakistan under the American sphere of influence during the Cold War and post 9/11, especially in Afghanistan.
Pakistan and Iran remained in opposite groups; only in recent years has China tried to bring Islamabad and Tehran together.
The struggle for supremacy, within the West Asia, pitches Iran and Saudi Arabia on opposite camps, with Pakistan aligned with the latter.
On Afghanistan and the Taliban, both countries have differed on objectives and strategies.
Until recently, Pakistan viewed Tehran as closer to New Delhi than Islamabad.
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb is seen as a Sunni one, pushing Tehran to have its own for the Shia world.
Finally, economically, the bilateral relationship is not strong enough to create a political stake.
The fact that Iran is planning to approach international arbitration for Pakistan’s reluctance to move ahead with the Iran-Pakistan pipeline should underline the harsh realities for Islamabad and Tehran.
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